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REGULATING CABLE TELEVISION RATES: A
PHANTOM FIRST AMENDMENT PROBLEM
Matthew Jolly
Abstract Public concern over cable television's status as a monopoly has generated a
movement to allow local franchising authorities to regulate cable service rates. Because
the courts have yet to hear a First Amendment challenge to imposing rate regulation on a
member of the media, the constitutionality of cable rate regulation is not settled. This
Comment argues that the restriction on speech resulting from rate regulation is out-
weighed by the substantial government interest in preventing unfair monopoly pricing
practices.
With the growth of the cable television industry, concern over
monopoly pricing tactics has fueled a growing sentiment to impose
rate regulation on cable operators. Cable operators currently operate
without competition from other providers in 99.5% of cable-wired cit-
ies.' Since cable television was deregulated in 1986, cable rates have
increased 61%, triple the inflation rate.' The National Cable Televi-
sion Association3 insists that other mediums, such as broadcast televi-
sion and the home video market, provide effective competition, but the
Consumer Federation of America estimates that competition within
the cable industry would reduce cable rates by 50%, saving consumers
$6 billion a year.' In response to national concern, the U.S. Senate
recently passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of
1992, a bill which amends title VI of the Communications Act of 1934
to restore the right of local regulatory authorities to regulate cable
television rates.'
The First Amendment status of imposing rate regulation on cable
television has never been addressed by the courts. Other cable regula-
tions have been struck down as violating operators' free speech,6 but
the Supreme Court has yet to define the precise scope of First Amend-
1. David Hage et al., Hidden Monopolies, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 3, 1992, at 47.
2. Id.
3. The National Cable Television Association is a group of cable operators that conducts
lobbying.
4. Hage et al., supra note 1, at 47-48.
5. S. 12, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The House has also passed a similar bill. H.R. 3560,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991). The bills have gone to committee and it seems likely that rate
regulation of some kind will be imposed on cable television in the near futplre.
6. Cox Cable Communications, Inc. v. United States, 774 F. Supp. 633 (M.D. Ga. 1991)
(striking down an exclusive franchising agreement); Century Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 710
F. Supp. 1552 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (striking down access channel requirements).
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ment protection afforded cable television. As a result, lower courts are
divided over the extent of permissible regulation of the cable industry.7
Rate regulation should not be considered an abridgement of the
First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. Rate regulation
of cable operators does not violate the First Amendment because the
restriction imposed on operator speech is outweighed by the substan-
tial government interest in preventing monopoly pricing. Accord-
ingly, the Supreme Court should uphold cable rate regulation in the
face of First Amendment challenges.
I. REGULATING CABLE TELEVISION RATES
Whether because of economic scarcity or exclusive franchising,
cable television enjoys local monopoly status and operates without
competition from other operators.8 As a result, the operators' ability
to increase subscription rates is limited solely by the elasticity of
demand9 and there is no need to price competitively. 10 In addition,
cable operators often obtain exclusive contracts to provide program-
ming in a given area, making it difficult for new operators to break
in.1 In some cases, the cable operators actually own the program-
ming provider. The nation's biggest cable operator, Telecommunica-
tions, Inc., owns an interest in TNT and the Discovery channel.12
Time Warner, the nation's second largest cable operator, owns HBO
and Cinemax. 3 As a result, new cable operators cannot effectively
compete because exclusive contracting and cross ownership prevents
them from offering much of the programming available from estab-
lished providers.
Cable television is subject to little effective cross-medium competi-
tion because of its ability to offer unique services. Broadcast television
and newspapers cannot provide the diversity of programming avail-
able on multi-channel cable systems. Multipoint Distribution Ser-
7. See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
8. Hage et al., supra note 1, at 47.
9. Elasticity of demand is simply a shorthand expression for the relationship between a
particular change in the price of a product and the corresponding change in demand for it.
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 6-7 (1985).
10. Id. at 17. If the demand is extremely elastic, cable's monopoly power would be limited
because any raise in cable rates would simply cause consumers to forego cable entirely.
However, the fact that cable operators have been able to substantially raise rates while gaining
customers indicates a demand curve that is not very elastic.
11. See Hage et al., supra note 1, at 47.
12. Id. at 48.
13. Id.
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vice,14 Satellite Master Antenna Television (SMATV),1 5 and home
satellite dishes 6 are unable to effectively compete with cable because
of high costs and technological limitations. SMATV has roughly one
million subscribers whereas, in 1988, 42.8 million households sub-
scribed to cable. 7 As a result, although the service areas of SMATV
and cable television often overlap, SMATV is limited to apartment
buildings and other complexes and is not prevalent enough to compete
with cable. The high cost of home satellite dishes has effectively lim-
ited their use to rural areas where cable television is unavailable."
None of these industries competes seriously with cable in their current
state of development.
Regulating cable television rates is one way of curtailing cable's
monopoly power, but it is a method that is potentially barred by the
First Amendment. Whether rate regulation unconstitutionally
restricts the free speech rights of cable operators depends both on the
specific mechanisms of regulation that are implemented and on the
scope of cable operators' expressive activities.
A. Pending Legislation: The Cable Television Consumer Protection
Act
The Cable Television Consumer Protection Act, 9 recently passed
by the Senate, provides an illustrative example of the way regulation of
cable television rates is likely to be implemented. The Act provides
that, where a cable system is not subject to effective competition,
either the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) or the local
franchising authority can impose regulations to insure that basic cable
service rates are reasonable. 20 To determine whether a cable operator
is subject to effective competition, the Act directs the regulating
authority to consider the number of subscribing households in the
community and the availability of more than one multi-channel video
programming distributor providing comparable programming at com-
parable rates.21 The Act directs the regulating authority to consider
14. Multipoint Distribution Service is essentially a wireless cable system transmitted to
subscribers by microwaves. See JAMES C. GOODALE, ALL ABOUT CABLE § 5.06 (1991).
15. SMATV links units in a building complex to a single satellite receiver. See &L § 5.08.
16. Home dishes allow their owners to receive satellite broadcasts directly. See id. § 5.09.
17. Id § 5.08; U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1989, at tbl. 900 (109th ed. 1989).
18. See GOODALE, supra note 14, § 5.09.
19. S. 12, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
20. Id. § 623. Basic service is the lowest tier of service subscribed to by at least 30% of cable
customers. Basic service must include retransmitted local television broadcasts. Id. § 623(b)(1).
21. Id.
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operators' rates in other markets, particularly operators subject to
effective competition, to determine whether a given operator's rates
are reasonable.22 The Act is an attempt to prevent the perceived
unfair and inefficient rate practices that have resulted from the "undue
market power" afforded cable operators by local monopoly status.23
The Act, however, raises First Amendment concerns. Whether the
Act or similar regulatory schemes would violate operators' free speech
rights depends on the extent of First Amendment protection afforded
the cable industry.
B. Cable Operators' Status as First Amendment Speakers
The Supreme Court stated in City of Los Angeles v. Preferred
Communications, Inc.24 that cable television "plainly implicates First
Amendment interests."2 Preferred Communications sued the city,
claiming that its First Amendment rights were violated when the city
denied the company a cable franchise.26 The Court held that opera-
tors act as speakers for First Amendment purposes when they create
their own programming for subscribers.27 In addition, operators act
as First Amendment speakers when they select programming, deter-
mining what material is cablecast28 and whether material should be
included as part of a higher tier of programming available only at an
additional charge.29 The recognition of cable operators' status as
speakers limits the ability of the government to regulate the industry
without violating the First Amendment.
Since the Preferred Communications decision, operators have
attacked government regulation of the industry as an unconstitutional
infringement of their First Amendment free speech rights. The opera-
tors have challenged access channel requirements,30 exclusive
22. Id § 623(c)(3).
23. Id § 2.
24. 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
25. Id. at 494.
26. Id at 490.
27. Id. at 494.
28. "Cablecast" refers to the carrying of programming on the cable wire network.
29. Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. at 494; see also Daniel Brenner, Cable Television and
the Freedom of Expression, 1988 DUKE L.J. 329, 353-55.
30. Access requirements force cable operators to sell time to third parties in an attempt to
limit operators' exclusive control over programming. Century Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo Alto,
710 F. Supp. 1552 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (striking down access channel requirements); Erie
Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Erie, 659 F. Supp. 580 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (upholding access
channels); Berkeshire Cablevision, Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1983), vacated as
moot, 773 F.2d 382 (Ist Cir. 1985) (upholding access channels).
876
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franchising," mandatory service requirements,32 and franchise fees.3 3
The courts have split over whether the regulations violate the First
Amendment. 4 As a result, it is unclear what standard should be used
to test the constitutionality of rate regulation."
II. FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF CABLE
TELEVISION REGULATION
Despite cable operators' status as First Amendment speakers, not
all regulations imposed on cable television unconstitutionally infringe
on free speech rights. Some regulations cannot be challenged under
the First Amendment because they do not restrict speech.3 6 More
importantly, regulations that restrict the speech of cable operators are
constitutionally permissable if supported by a substantial government
interest.3 7
A. Regulations that Do Not Restrict Speech
Some media regulations do not infringe on First Amendment inter-
ests. To raise a First Amendment issue, a regulation must conflict
with the interests that the First Amendment is intended to protect.3 1
Regulations that do not restrict speech or which actually serve First
Amendment interests do not violate the First Amendment.39 Thus, in
31. Many municipalities grant operators the exclusive right to provide cable service to their
residents, resulting in a municipally-insured monopoly position. Cox Cable Communications,
Inc. v. United States, 774 F. Supp. 633 (M.D. Ga. 1991) (striking down exclusive franchising);
Group W Cable, Inc. v. City of Santa Cruz, 669 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (striking down
exclusive franchising).
32. Mandatory service requirements are imposed by municipal authorities to insure that an
operator wires the entire city for cable upon being awarded a franchise. Telesat Cablevision, Inc.
v. City of Riviera Beach, 773 F. Supp. 383, 399-406 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (upholding universal
service requirements).
33. Franchise fee agreements condition the right to provide cable service to a municipality on
the payment of a percentage of profits to the city government. Telesa 773 F. Supp. 383, 406-07
(upholding franchise fees); Century Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 710 F. Supp. 1559 (N.D. Cal.
1988) (striking down franchise fees).
34. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
35. The sheer quantity of the literature discussing cable's First Amendment status serves as
an indication of the confusion involved. See PATRICK PARSONS, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT (1987); GEORGE H. SHAPIRO ET AL, CABLESPEECH: THE CASE FOR FIRST
AMENDMENT PROTECTION (1983); Brenner, supra note 29.
36. See infra notes 38-69 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 70-94 and accompanying text.
38. The First Amendment serves two fundamental purposes: the protection of individual
expressive activities and the advancement of the important state interest in the free flow of
information. PARSONS, supra note 35, at 79.
39. See id. at 79-92.
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Citizens Publishing Co. v. United States' the Supreme Court upheld
the application of the Sherman Antitrust Act41 to the media, saying:
The First Amendment, far from providing an argument against [the]
application of the Sherman Act, here provides powerful reasons to the
contrary. That Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse scurces is essential to
the welfare of the public .... Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the
Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is
not.42
Because the Antitrust Act did not restrict free speech but rather
preserved the First Amendment rights of the public, it did not conflict
with the First Amendment.
L Generally Applicable Regulations
Like other members of the media, cable television can be constitu-
tionally subjected to generally applicable regulations because such reg-
ulations do not present a threat to free speech.43 For example, the
media is subject to labor laws,' antitrust laws,45 and generally appli-
cable taxes.46 In Leathers v. Medlock,47 the Supreme Court upheld the
extension of Arkansas' sales tax to cable companies in the face of a
First Amendment challenge.4" The Court reascned that generally
applicable taxes do not present the threat of censorship inherent in
taxes that single out the media.4 9 The breadth of the Arkansas tax
limited its utility as a tool for the suppression of speech because an
unduly burdensome tax would necessarily be imposed on a broad con-
stituency.50 Courts have not viewed generally applicable regulations
such as the Arkansas tax as a threat to free speech.
40. 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
41. The Sherman Act prohibits agreements and mergers which operate to eliminate
competition in a given industry. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
42. Citizens Publishing, 394 U.S. at 139-40 (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326
U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
43. Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937) ("The [press] has no special
immunity from the application of general laws.").
44. Id.
45. Citizens Publishing, 394 U.S. at 139-40.
46. Leathers v. Medlock, I11 S. Ct. 1438 (1991).
47. 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1444. Taxes which single out the media are unconstitutional. See Minneapolis Star
& Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
50. "IT]he general applicability of any burdensome tax law helps to ensure that it will be met
with widespread opposition." Leathers, Il1 S. Ct. at 1443.
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2. Non-Infringing Media-Specific Regulations: The Importance of
Medium Characteristics
Media-specific regulations are likewise constitutional where the reg-
ulations do not infringe on First Amendment interests. Although
courts have never dealt with the impact of cable rate regulation on the
First Amendment, some courts faced with First Amendment chal-
lenges to other cable industry regulations have analogized cable to
radio and broadcast television. In the case of radio and broadcast tele-
vision, the Supreme Court has recognized that the scarcity of airwaves
necessarily limits the number of speakers and thus conflicts with the
First Amendment value of promoting the free flow of information.51
Accordingly, the Court has held that regulations which seek to com-
pensate for this natural scarcity and promote the free flow of informa-
tion are permissable even though they may restrict the speech of
individual broadcasters.52
For example, in Red Lion Broadcasting, Co. v. FCC,53 the Supreme
Court upheld the imposition of limited access requirements on a radio
broadcaster.54 The Court reasoned that the access requirements com-
pensated for the scarcity of available frequencies by allowing other
speakers to present their views within the medium.55 The require-
ments actually served First Amendment interests by insuring diversity
and promoting the free flow of information.
Although cable is not a broadcast medium, some courts facing First
Amendment attacks on industry regulation have analogized cable to
radio and broadcast television.56 The courts point to three aspects of
the medium that they contend limit the number of speakers and justify
compensatory regulations.5 First, space limitations within utility
51. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101-02
(1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1969) ("lit is idle to posit an
unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to
speak, write, or publish.").
52. "[T]he people as a whole retain their interest in free speech... and their collective right
to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment.
It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
53. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
54. Id. at 400-01. The limited access requirements at issue in Red Lion gave individuals who
had been subjected to a personal attack on the air a right of reply. Id. at 369-72.
55. Id. at 388-89.
56. Telesat Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Riviera Beach, 773 F. Supp. 383, 394 (S.D. Fla. 1991);
Berkeshire Cablevision v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 986 (D.R.I. 1983), vacated as moot, 773 F.2d
382 (1st. Cir. 1985).
57. Telesat, 773 F. Supp. at 395; Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Erie, 659 F. Supp.
580, 597 (W.D. Pa. 1987); Burke, 571 F. Supp. at 980.
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easements,5" like the scarcity of frequencies available for broadcasting,
limit the number of speakers able to utilize the medium. 9 Second,
cable television is a natural monopoly' in which economic forces
effectively limit the number of speakers within a given service area to
one.61 Third, the courts point out that the disruption associated with
the installation and maintenance of a cable system necessitates limiting
the number of providers.62 The courts reason that exclusive franchis-
ing, access channel requirements, and franchise fees are justified
because they are essentially compensatory measures that further First
Amendment interests by protecting the rights of the viewing public. 63
A second body of decisions disputes the analogy of cable to radio
and broadcast television, arguing that cable television more closely
resembles newspapers.64 In the case of newspapers, there is no physi-
cal scarcity which limits the number of possible speakers. As a result,
governmental interference with individual speech can not be justified
as necessary to insure the free flow of ideas. For example, in Miami
Herald v. Tornillo,65 the Supreme Court held that a statute imposing
access requirements on newspapers was unconstitutional.66 The Court
stated that economic forces limited the number of newspapers that
Miami could support, yet still held that access requirements were an
unconstitutional infringement on the paper's editorial discretion.67
58. Regulations governing the required spacing between coaxial cables and other utility pipes
or wires limit the ability of municipalities to add more services to its utility easements. There is
simply a finite amount of space both on the poles and under the streets.
59. Telesat, 773 F. Supp. at 396.
60. Like utilities, fixed costs and economies of scale make competition difficult, thereby
discouraging potential competitors and resulting in the creation of monopolies. See
HOVENKAMp, supra note 9, § 1.5.
61. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981),
cert dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982); Central Telecommunications. Inc. v. TCI Cablevision,
Inc., 800 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 910 (1987); Omega Satellite Prods. Co.
v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1982).
62. Berkeshire Cablevision v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 985 (D.R.I. 1983), vacated as moot,
773 F.2d 382 (Ist Cir. 1985).
63. Id. at 986-87. The courts also point to these same characteristics of the cable medium as
grounds for substantial government interest in regulating providers. See infra notes 86-89 and
accompanying text.
64. Century Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 710 F. Supp. 1552 (I.D. Cal. 1987); Group W
Cable, Inc. v. City of Santa Cruz, 669 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
65. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
66. Id. The statute at issue granted political candidates a right -o equal space to reply to
attacks on their record by a newspaper. Id at 243-44.
67. Id How broadly or narrowly to read the court's treatment of economic scarcity as a
justification for media regulation is a matter of considerable debate. Some commentators argue
that reading the decision as implicitly rejecting the economic scarcity rationale is not justified.
See Jerome A. Barron, On Understanding the First Amendment Status of Cable: Some Obstacles
in the Way, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1495 (1989); Debora L. Osgood, Note, Expanding the
880
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Courts analogizing cable to newspapers reject the contention that
the cable medium is subject to physical scarcity similar to that of the
broadcast media.68 The courts point out that as long as there is space
for overbuilds,6 9 the court is not confronted with the situation where
there are more speakers than the medium can handle.70 They dispute
cable's status as a natural monopoly and reason that the Supreme
Court effectively rejected economic scarcity as a basis for regulation in
Tornillo.71 Finally, they reject the suggestion that the disruption of
the public domain associated with cable installation is sufficient
grounds for increased regulation. 72 These courts point out that access
requirements, exclusive franchising, and franchise fees would be
unconstitutional if applied to newspapers and argue that there is no
reason to treat cable differently.73
B. Infringement on the First Amendment: When Infringement Is
Impermissible
In contrast to broadcast regulation and generally applicable laws,
many of the regulations imposed on cable operators infringe on First
Amendment interests. Not all infringing regulations, however, are
impermissible. To determine whether a regulation impermissibly
infringes on First Amendment rights, the courts balance the restric-
tion on speech against the government interest served by the
regulation.74
Different types of regulations require different levels of government
interest to pass constitutional muster. Content-based government reg-
ulations75 are only justified if they are narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest.76 Courts that have found cable regu-
Scarcity Rationale: The Constitutionality of Public Access Channel Requirements in Cable
Franchise Agreements, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 305, 332-35 (1986). But see SHAPIRO ET AL.,
supra note 35, at 123-24.
68. Century Fed, 710 F. Supp at 1554; Group W, 669 F. Supp. at 961.
69. Overbuilds occur where municipalities add cable to space within existing easements.
Many utility easements, both on poles and underground, are expandable. See, e.g., Century Fed.,
710 F. Supp. at 1573-74.
70. Group W, 669 F. Supp. at 964.
71. Id. at 965; see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
72. Group W, 669 F. Supp. at 966-67.
73. Century Fed., 710 F. Supp. at 1554.
74. JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 970-71 (1986).
75. Content-based regulations are regulations which target specific ideas or information.
LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2 (1988).
76. Id. § 12-13.
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lations" to be content based have uniformly declared them unconsti-
tutional.78 The constitutionality of content-neutral regulations,79 on
the other hand, is determined by applying the test developed by the
Supreme Court in United States v. O'Brien.80 The Supreme Court in
O'Brien upheld a statute prohibiting the burning of draft cards in the
face of a First Amendment challenge.8' The Court held that content-
neutral regulations are constitutional if: (1) the regulation furthers a
substantial government interest, (2) the government interest is unre-
lated to the suppression of free expression, and (3) the restriction on
speech is no greater than is necessary to serve the government inter-
est.82 The Court reasoned that because the government had a substan-
tial interest in insuring the continued availability of draft cards and
prohibiting the destruction of draft cards was an appropriately narrow
means of protecting that interest, the statute did not violate the First
Amendment.8 3
The difference between the standards for content-based and content-
neutral regulations is largely one of degree. Content-based regulations
are only upheld in unusual circumstances where the government inter-
est served by the regulation is of paramount importance.84 Content-
neutral regulations are upheld as long as there is some government
interest that outweighs the relatively minor infringement on speech. 5
Many cable regulations have been upheld as valid content-neutral
regulations.8 6  The courts reasoned that the regulations served sub-
77. The courts have never explicitly dealt with First Amendment challenges to rate
regulation, but they have dealt with challenges to many other types of regulation of cable
operators. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
78. Century Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 710 F. Supp. 1552, 1555 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Group
W Cable, Inc. v. City of Santa Cruz, 669 F. Supp. 954, 968-69 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
79. Content-neutral regulations are regulations which constrict the flow of information
without targeting specific ideas or information. See TRIBE, supra note 71, § 12-2.
80. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 377.
83. Id. at 381.
84. Examples of acceptable content-based regulations include defamation laws and
prohibition of speech which advocates lawless action. See TRIBE, supra note 71, § 12-2.
85. Id.
86. Telesat Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Riviera Beach, 773 F. Supp. 383, 404 (S.D. Fla. 1991)
(upholding requirement of universal service throughout city as valid content-neutral regulation);
Group W Cable, Inc. v. City of Santa Cruz, 669 F. Supp. 971 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (upholding
requirement of disclosure of operator's financial records); Berkeshire Cablevision v. Burke, 571
F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1983), vacated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985) (upholding access
requirements as valid content-neutral regulations supported by a substantial government
interest); see also Chicago Cable Communications v. Cable Comm'n, 879 F.2d 1540 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990) (upholding requirement that cable operators provide
four and one-half hours per week of locally produced and oriented programming).
882
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stantial government interests which outweighed the restriction on
speech.8 7 In the case of access channel requirements, for example, the
government interests served included promoting programming diver-
sity"8 and encouraging community participation in production. 9 The
court upheld the requirements because the restriction on speech was
no greater than necessary to promote the interests being served.'
Regulations that do not infringe on the First Amendment because
they compensate for scarcity generated by medium characteristics are
also justified as valid content-neutral regulations supported by a sub-
stantial government interest.91 The First Amendment goal of promot-
ing the diversity of speakers and the free flow of information also
serves as a government interest, justifying regulation.92 Further, many
of the medium characteristics which impact First Amendment inter-
ests also impact distinct government interests. For example, limited
space within utility easements both limits the number of speakers in
the cable medium and restricts the ability of municipalities to grant
future utility franchises to serve future needs. 93 Thus, municipalities
have an interest of their own to promote which is unrelated to the
First Amendment interest of promoting the free flow of information. 94
Other content-neutral cable regulations have been struck down by
courts where the government interest being served was insufficiently
substantial. In Century Federal, Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 95 the district
87. Telesat, 773 F. Supp. at 404; Group W, 669 F. Supp. at 971; Burke, 571 F. Supp. at 987.
88. Telesat 773 F. Supp. at 412; Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Erie, 659 F. Supp.
580, 599 (W.D. Pa. 1987).
89. Burke, 571 F. Supp. at 987; see also Chicago Cable 879 F.2d at 1549 (justifying local
origination channel requirements as promoting community involvement in cable television).
90. Burke, 571 F. Supp. at 988.
91. Courts point to medium characteristics both when discussing whether a regulation
infringes on the First Amendment at all and when discussing whether a regulation which does
impact free speech is supported by a substantial government interest. See, eg., Telesat, 773 F.
Supp. at 412 (upholding access channel requirements both on the ground that they actually foster
First Amendment interests and because they are rationally related to a substantial government
concern).
92. "Access requirements clearly further the substantial government interest of making cable
television available for the dissemination of ideas .... Erie Telecommunications, 659 F. Supp.
at 599.
93. Telesat, 773 F. Supp. at 396-97.
94. Id. Looking at medium characteristics as reflecting government interests allows courts to
uphold regulations different in kind. The government interest analysis provides a mechanism for
courts to validate regulations which further municipal goals but do not promote the free flow of
information. Thus medium characteristics can justify upholding regulations which do more than
compensate for medium scarcity.
95. 710 F. Supp. 1552 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
883
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court invalidated "state-of-the-art" requirements96 imposed on a local
cable franchise.97 The court held that avoiding the harmful restriction
imposed on cable operators' speech outweighed the government's
interest in ensuring high quality service.98
III. ANY INTRUSION BY RATE REGULATION ON THE
FIRST AMENDMENT IS OUTWEIGHED BY
STRONG GOVERNMENT INTERESTS
Rate regulation does not violate the First Amendment. Applying
the tests set forth in Part II, rate regulation infringes on First Amend-
ment interests because it is media specific. Further, rate regulation is
not immune from First Amendment scrutiny because it does not com-
pensate for characteristics of the cable medium which limit the
number of speakers. When rate regulation is content neutral, how-
ever, it can be justified because it serves a significant government inter-
est in preventing monopoly pricing practices. Courts considering
cable rate regulations should uphold them in the face of First Amend-
ment challenges.
A. Rate Regulation Infringes on First Amendment Interests
Rate regulation impacts First Amendment interests. Unlike labor
and antitrust laws, rate regulation is not a generally applicable law.
Because rate regulation is media specific, it potentially restricts opera-
tor speech. Further, rate regulation does not compensate for medium
characteristics which limit the number of speakers. Therefore, unlike
broadcast access requirements, the restriction on operator speech
caused by rate regulation is not outweighed by the competing First
Amendment interest in promoting the free flow of information.
L Rate Regulation Is Subject to First Amendment Scrutiny Because
It Is Not Generally Applicable
Rate regulation restricts speech because it is not a generally applica-
ble law. Unlike labor and antitrust laws, rate regulation singles out a
member of the media.99 Rate regulation poses a potential threat of
censorship not found in generally applicable regulations because it is
96. A "state-of-the-art" cable system required that the system be fully two-way and
interactive and that two coaxial cables be installed. Id. at 1556.
97. Id. at 1556-57.
98. Id.
99. Senate Bill 12 applies to "cable systems." S. 12, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991).
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media specific."o° As a result, courts addressing rate regulation will be
concerned that the mechanisms of regulation will be used to assert
government control over operator speech.
Rate regulation could adversely impact speech because it is media
specific. Although the overall impact on speech would be minimal, it
would be significant enough to require scrutiny under the First
Amendment. Rate regulation could restrict operator speech by inhib-
iting the willingness and ability of cable operators to deliver program-
ming. Even if regulatory authorities choose not to change cable rates
at all, the threat of crippling regulation might operate effectively as a
censor.101 Fear of regulatory retaliation could have a chilling effect on
a cable operator's willingness to carry controversial or critical
programing.
In addition, rate regulation would impact revenues, perhaps forcing
cable operators to cut costs. 102 Less money would be available to
expand the wire network and increase market penetration, slowing the
expansion of cable's audience.0 3 Similarly, less money would be avail-
able to spend on programming."0 4 Overall quality might deteriorate
with low production values diminishing viewership and undermining
the operator's ability to effectively communicate. 05 The operator
could be forced to raise the price of tiered programming to compen-
sate for revenue shortfalls, thereby decreasing the number of subscrib-
ers."° Finally, rate regulation might prevent operators from creating
100. For example, in Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575 (1983), the Supreme Court held that taxes which single out the media violate the First
Amendment. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
101. See, eg., Minneapolis Star 460 U.S. at 585 (the threat of severe taxation from a media-
specific tax could operate as a censor in violation of the First Amendment). Rate regulation,
however, can be distinguished from an unconstitutional tax on the media in other respects. See
infra note 145 and accompanying text.
102. SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 35, at 157. It is important to note, however, that revenues
would only be affected to the extent that they are unreasonable. Thus while operators would
perhaps have less money, it is in some sense only their ill-gotten gains which they would be
losing.
103. Id.; see, eg., Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) ("The tax here
involved is bad not because it takes money from the pockets of the [publishers] .... It is bad
because it is seen to be a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the
circulation of information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional
guarantees.").
104. "By regulating [cable] rates, the bill will slow cable growth by making expansion and
new programming less easy to finance." Malcoim S. Forbes Jr., Fact and Comment, FORBES,
March 16, 1992, at 25.
105. See SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 35, at 157.
106. Id.
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programs at the "margin of interest"' 1 7 because they would no longer
be profitable, thereby adversely affecting the diversity of available
programming.108
Although rate regulation might adversely impact operator speech,
the scope of that impact is limited.'0 9 Rate regulation would only
restrict operator speech if current revenues are being spent on increas-
ing the quality and availability of programming. To the extent rate
regulation reflects a competitive market price, however, the reduction
in revenues caused by rate regulation should simply act to reduce prof-
its that would otherwise go into the pockets of cable operators."10 So
long as only monopoly profits are reduced, the effect of rate regulation
on the quality, diversity, and availability of programming should be
minimal. Just as the "freedom to combine to keep others from [speak-
ing]" is not guaranteed by the First Amendment,"' neither is the free-
dom to realize monopoly profits from speech.
2. Rate Regulation Is Not an Attempt to Compensate for
Characteristics of the Cable Medium Which Impact
Speech Interests.
Rate regulation is not an attempt to compensate for medium char-
acteristics which limit the number of speakers." 2 Cable rate regula-
tion restricts individual speech without substantially increasing the
amount and diversity of programming.1 13 This distinguishes rate reg-
ulation from the access requirements imposed on radio and broadcast
television where the small restriction imposed on individual speech is
outweighed by the competing First Amendment value of promoting
107. Programs at the "margin of interest" are programs which appeal only to a narrow
segment of the cable audience rather than the mainstream. Losing such programs could have a
significant impact on the types of programming available.
108. See Sharon D. Moshavi, Could Cable Live With S.124 INFORMATION AccESS
COMPANY, Feb. 10, 1992, at 38 ("[S.12] would hurt narrow niche and new services ....
(quoting Bert Carp, vice president, government affairs, Turner Broadcasting).
109. Some commentators point out that regulation of basic cable service rates will not hinder
growth in the cable industry because basic service is not the avenue for current growth. Rather,
growth is occurring primarily in higher tier or specialty services and in local advertising, neither
of which is regulated under the current bill. Id.
110. See infra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
111. Citizen's Publishing v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 140 (1969); see supra note 41 and
accompanying text.
112. See supra part II.A.2.
113. In fact, by forcing cost-cutting measures, rate regulation could limit the availability and
diversity of programming. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
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the free flow of information." 4 Thus, courts faced with a First
Amendment challenge to rate regulation need not determine whether
cable television is more analogous to broadcast or print media. Even if
space limitations within utility easements115 or economic forces1 16
limit the number of speakers within the cable medium, rate regulation
conflicts with the First Amendment because it is not an attempt to
compensate for scarcity by increasing speaker access to the medium.
B. Although Rate Regulation Infringes on First Amendment
Interests, the Infringement Is Outweighed by the
Substantial Government Interest in Preventing Unfair
Monopoly Pricing Practices
Although rate regulation restricts speech, it is constitutional
because the restriction imposed on operator speech is outweighed by
the substantial government interest in preventing unfair prices.
Whether a given government interest is sufficiently substantial
depends in large part on a subjective weighing of the restriction on
speech against that interest. 7 Here, the potential restriction on oper-
ator speech is limited because rate regulation is content neutral and
only affects monopoly profits. Given the current status of the cable
industry,1 ' the significant government interest in preventing unfair
market practices by monopoly providers outweighs the relatively
minor restriction on operator speech.
1. Cable Rate Regulation Is Content Neutral
The Cable Television Consumer Protection Act provides an exam-
ple of a content-neutral mechanism for imposing cable rate regula-
tion. 1 9 Although the Act applies only to basic service, basic service is
defined in a content-neutral manner.12 To prevent cable operators
from tiering out of rate regulation, the Act provides that regulation
114. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. Here, although the restriction imposed on
operator speech is small, there is no corresponding attempt to significantly promote the free flow
of information.
115. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
117. This subjective element accounts for the disagreement among courts over the
constitutionality of specific cable regulations. See supra notes 30-33.
118. See supra notes 8-18 and accompanying text.
119. It is possible that content-based rate regulation could be imposed. Such regulation
would likely be unconstitutional because it would not be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. However, content-neutral
rate regulation is much more likely because it would effectively address the current problems of
the cable market.
120. S. 12, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 623(b)(3) (1991).
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can be imposed on the lowest tier of service subscribed to by at least
thirty percent of the cable system's customers if fewer than thirty per-
cent subscribe only to basic service. 2 This distinction is not based on
content, however, since the programming included in either basic or
tiered service is left to the discretion of the operator. 22 Thus, under
the current Act and any likely legislation responding to monopoly
pricing concerns, rate regulation applies to all cable operators, without
regard to the content of their programming. Courts addressing this
type of content-neutral regulation should apply the O'Brien test. 23
2. Rate Regulation Is Constitutional Under the O'Brien Test
Cable rate regulation is constitutional under the O'Brien test.124
First, rate regulation furthers a substantial government interest in
preventing unfair monopoly pricing. Second, the government interest
in preventing pricing abuses is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression. Finally, the restriction on speech is no greater than is nec-
essary to serve the government interest being furthered.
a. Rate Regulation Furthers the Substantial Government Interest in
Preventing Unfair Cable Rates
The government interest served by rate regulation is the prevention
of unfair monopoly pricing practices.1 25 Cable's monopoly status is
economically inefficient and unfair to consumers. As local monopo-
lies, cable providers can increase rates to maximize profits without fear
of being undercut by competitors. 126  Rate regulation provides a
framework of accountability for subscription rates normally provided
by a competitive market. In a competitive market, a customer can
switch to a different provider if service is inadequate or pricing is
121. Id. § 623(bX1).
122. "A cable operator may add to or delete from a basic cable service tier any video
programming other than retransmitted local television broadcast signals." Id. § 6230bX3). The
requirement that local broadcast signals be retransmitted does not mean that the Act is content-
based. The cable operator must carry the local signal as part of its basic service regardless of the
content of the broadcast. Thus, the Act's "must carry" provision is not an attempt by the
government to control the content of cable television, it simply limits the content control given to
the operator.
123. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); see supra notes 74-78 and accompanying
text.
124. Id at 377; see supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
125. S. 12, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. § 2(2) (1991).
126. As monopolies, cable operators can increase the unit price until the revenue gained is
outweighed by the revenue lost through decreased sales. HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, § 1.2. The
result is waste because consumers buy less of the monopolized product even though it costs less
in terms of real resources to produce. Id. § 1.3.
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unfair.12 7 No such opportunity exists where the provider is a monop-
oly. 128 In place of the consumers' ability to purchase cable services
from a competitor, rate regulation invests local franchising authorities
with the power to insure reasonable rates. 129 Regulatory accountabil-
ity allows the viewing public to have an impact on cable rates and
service without foregoing cable entirely. 130
It is not the role of the courts to determine whether rate regulation
is the best solution to the problem of monopoly pricing in the cable
industry. Regulation of industries has often been criticized as expen-
sive, ineffective, and unfair.' Concern over the effectiveness of regu-
lation combined with a faith in free market mechanisms served as the
engine driving the deregulation of cable television and other industries
in the 1980s.'1 2 Whether the free market or a regulatory regime better
deals with the problem of monopoly power, however, is a policy ques-
tion that should be resolved at the legislative level.' 33 Rate regulation
satisfies the first element of the O'Brien test because it is a reasonable
attempt by the government to further its substantial interest in
preventing unfair monopoly pricing by cable operators.
b. The Interest Served by Rate Regulation Is Unrelated to
Suppression of Speech
The government interest in controlling monopoly pricing is not
related to the suppression of free expression. The Cable Television
Consumer Protection Act, for example, does not arbitrarily single out
a small group of providers within the cable industry and present the
potential for abuse involved in intramedium discrimination.13 1
Neither is there any evidence that the drive for regulation of cable
rates is motivated by a desire to suppress the speech of cable opera-
127. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 20 (1982).
128. Id.
129. S. 12, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 623(b) (1991).
130. Under the Cable Television Consumer Protection Act, viewers could operate through
the local regulatory agency to insure reasonable rates. Without regulation, the only way
subscribers can affect cable rates is to cancel their subscriptions and go without cable service.
131. See, e-g., BREYER, supra note 123, at 1-4.
132. See Hage et al., supra note 1, at 43-44.
133. Thus it is not the courts'job to determine whether rate regulation is the best means for
dealing with monopoly power as long as it does further the government interest in preventing
unfair pricing.
134. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
591-93 (1983) (use tax on newspaper supplies held to violate the First Amendment because it
singled out a small group of publishers within the press).
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tors. 135 Rather, rate regulation is motivated by the desire to prevent
unfair monopoly pricing, to promote fairness and efficiency. ' 36 As a
result, rate regulation satisfies the second part of the O'Brien test.
c. The Restriction Imposed on Speech by Rate Regulation Is No
Greater than Necessary
The restriction on speech imposed by rate regulation is no greater
than is essential to further the government interest in preventing
monopoly pricing practices. First, rate regulation would only affect
providers who have local monopolies.137 Providers. who were compet-
ing with other cable operators or with similar mediums would not be
subject to rate regulation.1 38 Second, only monopoly profits would be
affected. The ability of cable operators to market and deliver their
programming would not be substantially impaired. 39 In addition, the
potential for abuse by the regulatory agency would be checked by the
courts and the FCC." Thus, if a regulator is abusing its authority in
an attempt to control programming content, the operator can file a
complaint with the commission or challenge the regulator's actions in
court.
Antitrust laws will not provide a less restrictive solution to monop-
oly pricing practices. 4' Antitrust laws are designed to remove private
impediments to a competitive market. 42 In the case of cable, the
obstacles to workable competition are not private; rather, they are
inherent in the industry. Because of the fixed costs associated with
wiring a city for cable service, operators find it progressively cheaper
to supply extra units of service.' 43 This economy of scale is sufficiently
great such that the unit cost of service would rise significantly if more
than one operator served a given area." As a result, new operators
135. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 242-51 (1936) (tax on small group of
newspapers was unconstitutional because it was an attempt to limit circulation of information).
136. See supra part III.B.2.a.
137. In the Cable Television Consumer Protection Act, regulation is only authorized where
the operator is not subject to effective competition. S. 12, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. § 623(b)(1)
(1991).
138. Id.
139. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
140. Review by the FCC is specifically provided for in the C.ble Television Consumer
Protection Act. S. 12, 102d. Cong., 1st Sess. § 623(b)(2)(B) (1991).
141. See BREYER, supra note 123, at 159 ("Antitrust is not.., an effective way to control the
market power of a natural monopolist.").
142. Id. at 159.
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are unwilling and unable to compete with established providers. 45
Further obstacles to a competitive market result from the practice of
exclusive franchising."' Antitrust laws do not provide an effective
alternate solution to the problem of monopoly pricing because the
problem of cable's undue market power is not the result of private
impediments to competition.
Taxing monopoly profits is not a less restrictive solution to the prob-
lem of unfair pricing in the cable industry. 47 Taxation potentially
impacts speech in much the same way as rate regulation because it
reduces revenues.1 48 Further, a tax would not necessarily eliminate
the burden placed on consumers. It would simply transfer excess prof-
its from the operator to the government. In addition, taxes that single
out the media are presumptively unconstitutional because there are
less restrictive means for generating revenue. 149 Courts might be sus-
picious that a tax on the cable industry was really a revenue generating
measure in disguise and consequently hold it unconstitutional. As a
result, taxing the cable industry is not a less restrictive solution to
monopoly pricing.1 50
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts considering cable television rate regulation should hold that
such regulation is constitutional under the First Amendment.
Although rate regulation impacts operator speech, the impact is mini-
mal because rate regulation only affects monopoly profits and it is
imposed without regard to program content. Given the current condi-
145. In addition, exclusive contracts and cross ownership between operators and
programming providers make it difficult for new operators to break in. See supra notes 8-13 and
accompanying text.
146. See supra note 31 (discussion of exclusive franchising).
147. The government need not apply the least restrictive regulation imaginable to pass the
O'Brien test. Courts need not conjure up every conceivable alternative means by which the
government might achieve its interest. Century Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 710 F. Supp.
1559, 1569 n.16 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
148. A tax designed to prevent monopoly profits would tax all profits over a specified
percentage at a rate of 100%. See BREYER, supra note 123, at 164-71. Taxation would cause
operators to cut costs, decreasing the availability and diversity of programming. Any attempt by
operators to pass on the tax to the consumers would fail since the increased revenues would be
taxed at the 100% rate.
149. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
585-86 (1983) (taxes which single out the media are unconstitutional because revenue can be
generated just as effectively by generally applicable taxes without endangering free speech). In
contrast, there is no less restrictive method than rate regulation for eliminating unfair pricing.
150. Another possible alternative solution would be nationalization of the cable industry.
Nationalization, while solving many of the economic problems, would result in an extreme form
of government control over the content of programming.
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tions of the cable industry, the government interest in insuring fairness
and accountability for cable rates outweighs the potential impact on
operator speech. The balance of interests favors rate regulation.
